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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






FRANCIENNA B. GRANT, 




REVERA INC./REVERA HEALTH SYSTEMS; 
 PRISCILLA MILLER, In her Official Capacity 
as Rehabilitation Director; PREMIER 
THERAPY SERVICES; John or Mary Does 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-05857) 
Chief District Judge: Jerome B. Simandle       
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 12, 2016 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 








 Francienna B. Grant appeals from orders of the District Court granting summary 
judgment to the defendants, denying her motions for reconsideration, and denying a 
motion seeking an order dismissing a counterclaim and seeking an extension of time to  
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appeal.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the appeal for the most part for lack 
of jurisdiction and affirm in part to the extent of our jurisdiction. 
 Grant initially filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Grant, a physical therapist, alleged that the defendants, 
Revera Inc./Revera Health Systems, Premier Therapy Services, and Priscilla Miller, 
engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct after she suffered a work-related 
shoulder injury.1  The action was transferred to the District of New Jersey, and, following 
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Grant claimed that the 
defendants (1) failed to accommodate her disability; (2) failed to accommodate her 
religion; (3) failed to intervene in the face of workplace harassment; (4) subjected her to 
unequal terms and conditions of employment; (5) wrongfully terminated and retaliated 
against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-
12117 (“ADA”); (6) breached her employment contract; and (7) committed fraud by 
terminating her from her position at the Linwood Care Center pursuant to false 
allegations.  The defendants argued that termination was proper due to certain issues 
concerning Grant’s time records and her allegedly poor communication with her 
supervisor regarding her work limitations.  In their answer to the complaint, defendants 
Revera Health Systems and Premier Therapy Services asserted a counterclaim against 
Grant for $2,500.00 pursuant to the terms of a Sign-On Bonus Agreement which required 
her to remain employed for two years. 
                                              




 In a thorough decision and order entered on the docket on December 23, 2014, the 
District Court awarded summary judgment to the defendants.  The Court concluded that 
Grant failed to exhaust her religious accommodation claim, and adduced no, or 
insufficient evidence, in support of any legally cognizable claims for breach of contract, 
fraud, and/or ADA discrimination under any theory.  The District Court dismissed the 
defendants’ counterclaim for breach of contract without prejudice to reinstatement should 
they choose to pursue it.  
 On January 20, 2015, Grant filed her first motion for “reargument of dispositive 
motions.”  In an order entered on February 24, 2015, the District Court denied the 
motion, concluding that Grant failed to identify any basis for reconsideration.  Rather, she 
had merely reiterated in identical fashion all of her prior arguments concerning the record 
evidence in support of her various claims.  Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to briefly 
address each of her claims anew, and found that none warranted reconsideration.  Insofar 
as this motion for reconsideration was timely filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), it tolled 
the time for appealing the District Court’s December 23, 2014 summary judgment 
decision.  Grant had thirty (30) days from the District Court’s February 24, 2015 order, or 
until March 26, 2015, in which to appeal to this Court, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) 
(providing for a 30 day appeal period), and obtain review of the District Court’s decision 
awarding summary judgment to the defendants.  Instead of taking an appeal by that date, 
on March 17, 2015, Grant filed a second, untimely motion for reconsideration of the 
District Court’s December 23, 2014 decision.  Grant alleged that reconsideration was 
warranted because the District Court failed to render a ruling on her motion for summary 
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judgment, and because the Court deprived her of her right to be heard through oral 
argument.   
 In an order entered on July 8, 2015, the District Court denied the second motion 
for reconsideration, concluding that the local rules did not contemplate second motions 
for reconsideration; rather, the appropriate procedure was for Grant to appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).  
The Court reasoned that, in any event, Grant had failed to identify an intervening change 
in controlling law, the presence of new, previously unavailable, evidence, or the need to 
correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.  Instead, she had again merely 
reiterated her contrary view of the record evidence considered by the Court in its 
December 23, 2014 decision, and revisited in its February 24, 2015 decision. 
 On September 2, 2015, Grant filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s 
July 8, 2015 order, resulting in an appeal docketed at C.A. No. 15-3165.  Our Clerk 
advised Grant in a letter that her appeal would be submitted to a motions panel for 
possible dismissal due to two jurisdictional defects, the possibility of an outstanding 
counterclaim and the untimeliness of the appeal.  In response to this letter, on September 
22, 2015, Grant filed a motion in the district court seeking an order dismissing the 
counterclaim, and seeking an extension of time to appeal the District Court’s July 8, 2015 
order.  In essence, Grant sought to cure the jurisdictional defects associated with her 
appeal.   
 In an order entered on October 26, 2015, the District Court denied the motion as 
moot to the extent that Grant sought dismissal of the breach of contract counterclaim.  
The Court reasoned that it already had dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice, and 
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that the defendants clearly had exhibited no intention of pursuing it.  Therefore, no 
counterclaim remained to be adjudicated.  The Court then considered whether an 
extension of time to appeal the order entered on July 8, 2015 was warranted under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) but held that it was not for two reasons.  
First, Grant did not request an extension until September 22, 2015, over 45 days after the 
expiration of the normal appeal period, and thus her request for an extension was 
untimely under the Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(i).  Second, she had shown neither good cause nor 
excusable neglect, in that she offered no explanation for why she did not file a notice of 
appeal within the required time, provided no facts to support her request for an extension, 
and had filed frivolous motions for reconsideration.  Meanwhile, on October 6, 2015, our 
Clerk dismissed the appeal docketed at No. 15-3165 for failure to prosecute because 
Grant did not pay the filing fees. 
 On November 12, 2015 Grant filed a notice of appeal, seeking review in this Court 
of the District Court’s July 8, 2015 and October 26, 2015 orders, resulting in the instant 
appeal.  But in her brief on appeal, Grant primarily challenges the District Court’s 
summary judgment decision, and the Court’s orders denying her first and second motions 
for reconsideration.  To a limited extent, she has argued that the Court’s October 26, 2015 
order denying her motion seeking an order dismissing the counterclaim and an extension 
of time to appeal was in error.  The appellees in their brief have argued that the appeal 
should be dismissed as untimely except with respect to the District Court’s October 26, 
2015 order, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grant’s 
motion seeking an order dismissing the counterclaim as moot and denying an extension 
of time to appeal. 
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 We will dismiss the appeal for the most part for lack of jurisdiction and affirm in 
part to the extent of our jurisdiction.  The time periods prescribed for filing a notice of 
appeal in a civil case are mandatory and jurisdictional.  Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 
209-11 (2007).  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) provides that a notice of 
appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment.  The District Court awarded 
summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim, albeit 
without prejudice, in an order entered on December 23, 2014.  A timely filed motion for 
reconsideration, that is, one “filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), will toll the time for taking an appeal until the District Court 
disposes of the motion, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).  Grant’s January 20, 2015 motion 
for reconsideration was timely filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and, accordingly, she 
then had thirty (30) days from the District Court’s February 24, 2015 order denying this 
motion, or until March 26, 2015, in which to timely appeal to this Court, see Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Her failure to file a notice of appeal by this date deprives us of jurisdiction 
to review the District Court’s decision awarding summary judgment to the defendants 
and order denying her first motion for reconsideration.  Accordingly, we may not address 
or consider the merits of the vast majority of the arguments in her brief. 
 Grant’s untimely second motion for reconsideration filed on March 17, 2015 did 
not toll the time for taking an appeal.  See Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 280 
(3d Cir. 2010) (untimely Rule 59(e) motion, even one that was not objected to in the 
district court, does not toll the time to file notice of appeal).  We also lack jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s July 8, 2015 order denying Grant’s second motion for 
reconsideration, because her November 12, 2015 notice of appeal was not filed within 30 
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days of the order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and because the District Court declined to 
grant her an extension of time to appeal this order. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s October 26, 2015 order 
denying Grant’s motion seeking an order dismissing the counterclaim and an extension of 
time to appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm.  Before Grant’s original appeal was 
dismissed for failure to prosecute, the defendants filed a jurisdictional response in which 
they asserted that, although the District Court dismissed the counterclaim without 
prejudice to reinstatement in the event that they wished to pursue it, they took no such 
reinstatement action and thus all claims were fully resolved by the District Court’s 
December 23, 2014 order.  The defendants made the same argument in opposition to 
Grant’s September 22, 2015 motion seeking an order denying the counterclaim.  Under 
these circumstances, the District Court properly concluded that no counterclaim remained 
to be adjudicated and thus that Grant’s motion was moot in part.  An order dismissing a 
counterclaim without prejudice is normally not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, but since “a dismissal with leave to amend will be treated as a final order if the 
plaintiff has elected to stand upon the original complaint,” Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 
146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d 
Cir.2007)), it follows that a dismissal of a counterclaim with leave to reinstate will be 
treated as a final order if the defendant has elected not to seek reinstatement.  We are 
satisfied that the defendants elected to stand on the dismissal of their counterclaim.  At no 
time after the filing of their answer to the complaint did they indicate an intention to 
pursue the counterclaim, they have recently reaffirmed that they had no intention of 
pursuing the counterclaim, and, in arguing that the District Court’s December 23, 2014 
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decision is final and appealable, they will have “fully relinquish[ed] the ability to further 
litigate [this] unresolved [counterclaim],” Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Dannenberg v. Software 
Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A) provides that the “district court 
may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if: (i) a party so moves no later than 30 days 
after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and (ii) regardless of whether its 
motion is filed before or during the 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) 
expires, that party shows excusable neglect or good cause.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A).  
We generally review the District Court’s decision not to grant an extension of time to 
appeal for an abuse of discretion.  See Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 
315, 322 (3d Cir. 2012).  With respect to subparagraph (ii) of Rule 4(a)(5), the 
determination of whether neglect is excusable “is at bottom an equitable one, taking 
account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.”  Pioneer 
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associate Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 
(1993).  Factors to consider when making this equitable determination include “the 
danger of prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on 
judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  See also Ragguette, 691 F.3d at 319, 324.  The record here reveals the 
proper exercise of discretion by the District Court in denying Grant an extension of time 
to appeal the July 8, 2015 order denying her second motion for reconsideration.  The 
District Court correctly concluded that Grant’s Rule 4(a)(5) request was untimely under 
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subparagraph (i) of rule, and reasonably concluded that Grant provided no persuasive 
arguments showing good cause or excusable neglect for her failure to timely file a notice 
of appeal.  Nothing in her brief on appeal undermines the District Court’s excusable 
neglect determination. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal in part for lack of 
jurisdiction and affirm the District Court’s October 26, 2015 order.  Appellant’s motion 
to submit the depositions of Miller, Willey and McConnell on disc is denied.2 
 
 
                                              
2 We note that Grant has already filed a two-volume appendix. 
